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RATIONAL BARGAINING THEORY AND 
CONTRACT: DEFAULT RULES, 
HYPOTHETICAL CONSENT, THE 
DUTY TO DISCLOSE, AND 
FRAUD 
RANDY E. BARNE'IT* 
In his forthcoming book, Risks and Wrongs, 1 Jules Coleman 
covers a lot of territory, ranging from political to moral philos-
ophy, from tort theory to the theory of crimes. Along the way, 
he touches upon important issues of contract theory, including 
the question of how the default rules of contract ought to be 
chosen. The concept of default rules is of particular interest to 
me because it undermines the legal realist view that, because all 
of contract law fills gaps in consent, the substance of contract 
law has little to do with consent. Once it is acknowledged, how-
ever, that most of contract law consists of default rather than 
immutable rules, then consent plays a far larger role in contract 
theory than is often admitted. For when certain conditions ob-
tain, the parties' silence in the face of a default rule could well 
constitute consent to its imposition. 
In this paper, I begin by responding to Coleman's rational 
choice approach to choosing default rules. In Part I, I apply the 
expanded analysis of contractual consent and default rules I 
have recently presented elsewhere2 to explain how rational bar-
gaining, hypothetical consent, and actual consent figure in the 
determination of contractual default rules. Whereas Coleman 
advocates the centrality of rational bargaining analysis to this 
determination, I explain why rational bargaining theory's role 
must be subsidiary to that of consent. 
I then tum my attention to Coleman's appraisal of con-
tracting parties' duty to disclose information concerning there-
sources that are the subject of a contractual transfer. In Part II, 
I argue that both Coleman's and Anthony Kronman's analyses 
* Norman & Edna Freehling Scholar and Professor of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology, Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
1. jULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (forthcoming 1992) (manuscript datedjuly 
1991, on file with author; pages cited to manuscript). 
2. See Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 
VA. L. REV. 821 (1992). 
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of John Marshall's opinion in the classic case of Laidlaw v. Or-
gan 3 overlook an important function of his holding permitting 
nondisclosure. I conclude by proposing a conception of fraud 
that explains why trading on and profiting from certain types of 
undisclosed information is not properly deemed fraudulent. 
I. DEFAULT RULES AND HYPOTHETICAL CONSENT 
A. Coleman~ Analysis of Default Rules and Hypothetical Consent 
A default rule is a type of gap-filling background rule that is 
used by courts to interpret matters about which a contract is 
silent. What distinguishes default rules from other kinds of 
background rules is that they can be supplanted by the ex-
pressed consent of the parties, whereas "immutable" back-
ground rules will be enforced no matter what the parties may 
say on the matter.4 An example of a default rule is the use by 
courts of the expectancy measure of damages for breach of 
contract. 5 An example of an immutable rule, which parties can-
not contract around, is the implied duty of good faith perform-
ance of a contract. 6 
In his discussion of contract, Coleman addresses the ques-
tion of how default rules should be chosen. As Coleman notes, 
many law-and-economics scholars have argued that default 
rules should reflect those rights and duties to which the parties 
would have agreed ex ante. 
Thus, when transaction costs make an explicit agreement too 
costly ex ante, the court should apply a default or gap-filling 
rule that "mimics" the outcome of a hypothetical contract 
between them. The hypothetical contract is one the parties 
would have made had the transaction costs not made their 
doing so irrational. 7 
Coleman sees this approach as raising the following problem: 
3. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817). 
4. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in lncomplele Con/racls: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE LJ. 87 (1989) ("Default rules fill the gaps in incomplete 
contracts; they govern unless the parties contract around them. Immutable rules can-
not be contracted around; they govern even if the parties attempt to contract around 
them."). 
5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS§ 347 (1979). 
6. Compare U.C.C. § 1-203 ("Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obli-
gation of good faith in its performance or enforcement.") wilh U.C.C. § 1-102(3) ("The 
effect of this Act may be varied by agreement, except as otherwise provided in this act 
and except that the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care pre· 
scribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by agreement .... "). 
7. CoLEMAN, supra note 1, at 268 (footnotes omitted). 
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"Given the ex post nature of the obligations and rights it distrib-
utes, is there any reason to think that one default rule is any 
more justifiable than another? Is there, in particular, a case to 
be made for the ex ante contract as the default rule?"8 Coleman 
contends that rational bargaining theory can both determine 
the content of counterfactual "majoritarian" default rules9 and 
justify their imposition by a legal system. 
Coleman argues, first, that rational bargaining theory is the 
best way to determine the scope and content of parties' hypo-
thetical consent. Then he attempts to connect his rational bar-
gaining approach to hypothetical consent with actual consent. Io 
Coleman's project is ultimately to convince anyone who is al-
ready committed either to consent or to efficiency accounts of 
contractual obligation that a rational bargaining model must 
occupy a central place in their theories of obligation. 
Coleman argues that a consent theorist could favor a rational 
bargaining approach to hypothetical contracts for two reasons. 
The first is that "[h]ypothetical consent is a proxy for actual 
consent," II and a rational bargaining model can determine the 
content of hypothetical consent. A court searching for what the 
parties have agreed upon when they are silent will choose a hy-
pothetical provision that, at the time of formation, appears to 
improve the lot of at least one of the parties and not worsen the 
situation of either. "From the fact that [such a solution] makes 
no one worse off ... we are to infer that [the parties] would 
have consented. Consent follows as a matter of logic from con-
siderations of rational self-interest."I2 
The problem with this analytic connection between rational 
self-interest and hypothetical consent is patent, and Coleman is 
quick to note it: The concept of rational seff-interest is doing 
all the work. Hypothetical "consent" becomes merely a label 
that is attached to the conclusion with no explanatory or justifi-
8. Id. at 268. 
9. Default rules conforming to a hypothetical bargain are commonly called 
"majoritarian" because they seek to identifY the term to which most parties would have 
agreed. I call them "counterfactual" because they refer to what most parties would 
have but did not agree to. In contrast, what I call "conventionalist" default rules, dis-
cussed below, refer to what most parties do in fact mean by their silence. 
10. Coleman also argues why an efficiency theorist might have use for the rational 
bargaining approach, but I leave this issue to others. See Richard Craswell, Efficiency and 
Rational Bargaining in Contractual Settings, 15 HARv.J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 805 (1992). 
11. CoLEMAN, supra note 1, at 269. 
12. Id. at 272. 
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catory force of its own. "[I]n arguments of this sort," Coleman 
explains, 
there appears to be nothing expressed by the concept of hy-
pothetical consent that is not already captured in the idea of 
rational self-interest. The distinction between consent and 
rational self-interest central to moral theory apparently 
evaporates. The claim that imposing obligations ex post is jus-
tified because the parties would have consented to them ex 
ante adds nothing to a defense of such a proposal that is not 
already expressed by the argument that imposing obliga-
tions ex post is justified whenever such obligations would have 
been rational for the parties ex ante. Thus, one might say that 
the reliance on ex ante rational bargaining provides a ration-
ality or welfarist defense of the default rule, not a consensu-
alist one. 13 
Instead, Coleman recommends that the consent theorist view 
the relationship between hypothetical rational bargaining and 
hypothetical consent as epistemic, not analytic. 
What it would have been rational for the parties to bargain 
to ex ante is not equivalent to, nor does it entail, anything 
about what they would have agreed to, but it is, nevertheless, 
evidence, perhaps the best evidence, of it .... In the absence 
of contradictory evidence, that is evidence contrary to that 
derived from the hypothetical rational bargain, it is legiti-
mate to infer that the parties would have consented to that 
which would have been the outcome of a rational bargain 
between them. 14 
Having established an epistemic connection between the hypo-
thetical rational bargain and the concept of hypothetical con-
sent, however, this approach immediately confronts the 
following problem: What connection, if any, exists between hy-
pothetical consent and actual consent? Why should one care 
about consent that by hypothesis is hypothetical? 
Coleman considers the argument that, by consenting ex ante 
to legal enforcement, parties consent to the enforcement ex post 
of default rules chosen according to the rational bargaining 
method. 
[B]y the very act of contracting the parties consent not only 
to a framework of explicitly created rights and duties, but to 
a jurisdiction for resolving conflicts that might arise in con-
struing those rights and duties. Should the occasion arise, 
13. Id. I concur. 
14. /d. at 273. 
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the jurisdiction to which the parties consent is authorized to 
impose rights and duties ex post that were not made explicit ex 
ante. To contract is, among other things, to consent to the 
relevant default provisions of a particular jurisdiction. Thus, 
the rights and responsibilities allocated by a default rule ex 
post are, in a suitable sense, consented to ex ante. 15 
787 
According to Coleman, this approach avoids the need to spec-
ify the relationship between rational bargaining and hypotheti-
cal consent by positing the existence of actual consent to the 
terms determined by a rational bargaining model. "The impor-
tance ofhypothetical consent simply disappears, and with it the 
need to establish an evidentiary or analytic connection between 
it and the ex ante rational bargain." 16 
Coleman makes two criticisms of this "consent to jurisdic-
tion" approach. First, he argues that if this "argument for the 
default rule works at all, it works too well," 17 because it would 
apparently justify any default rule, and even any immutable rule, 
a legal system may impose. "For if by consenting to a contract, 
one consents to ajurisdiction's default rule, then one consents 
to whatever rule the court applies: from those aimed at recon-
structing a hypothetical bargain to those imposing obnoxious 
terms, and so on." 18 Second, Coleman questions "whether it 
works at all." 19 Representing parties' consent to legal enforce-
ment as a consent to the entire take-it-or-leave-it set of default 
rules that will be applied is unrealistic because parties hardly 
have any choice among jurisdictions. As Coleman argues: 
[T]he parties could be said to consent to a relevant author-
ity's default rule only if they willingly, that is, noncoercively, 
choose it. This is not typically the case, however. The default 
rules of any jurisdiction are generally a nonnegotiable part 
of their bargain. Though the parties can often contract 
around them, they cannot substitute the default provisions 
15. !d. at 273-74. This argument is not entirely hypothetical. I originally offered it to 
Professor Coleman in private correspondence relating to his earlier incarnation of the 
subject in jules L. Coleman, Douglas D. Heckathorn, & Steven M. Maser, A Bargaining 
Theory Approach to Default Provisions and Disclosure Rules in Contract Law, 12 HARv.J.L. & 
Pun. PoL'Y 639 (1989). I develop the argument considerably in Barnett, supra note 2. 
16. CoLEMAN, supra note I, at 274. 
17. ld. at 275. 
18. Coleman goes on to say: "This reconstruction of the consent theory of contrac-
tual obligation, in other words, provides no sense in which the ex ante rational contract 
is special. If the ex ante rational bargain as a default rule has a special attraction for this 
sort of consent theorist, this line of argument does not do a very good job of expres-
sing or developing it." ld. at 274-75. But this assumes what must be shown-that a 
consent theorist does care about the ex ante bargain. 
19. ld. at 275. 
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of other jurisdictions. For that reason, it is questionable 
whether by consenting to a framework of contractual rights 
and responsibilities the parties consent to the application of 
the operative default provisions. 20 
From the failure of this argument, Coleman concludes that ra-
tional bargaining theory, not consent, provides the justification 
for choosing default rules that reflect hypothetical consent. Far 
from consent being the basis of contract, consent is significant 
only because terms that are actually chosen are likely in prac-
tice to reflect what is rational for parties to have chosen. 
"Thus," according to Coleman, "one might say that the reli-
ance on an ex ante rational bargaining provides a rationality or 
welfarist defense of the default rule, not a consensualist one."21 
In the next section, I recast the "consent to jurisdiction" ap-
proach to avoid both these challenges. After clarifying the rela-
tionship between consent and the hypothetical rational 
bargain, I conclude that while the rational bargain model may 
play a role in a consent theory, it is hardly as central a role as 
Coleman contends. 
B. Reconstructing the "Consent to jurisdiction" Argument 
In a sense, we have joined a story in the middle. Whereas 
Coleman begins by assuming implicitly the validity of the hypo-
thetical rational bargain and only then asks how a consent theo-
rist might account for it, a consent theorist argues that consent 
is central to the creation of contractual obligation.22 Thus, the 
issue is what, if any, relationship exists between consent and a 
rational bargain model. If there is no such relationship, then so 
much the worse for the rational hypothetical bargain. 
Let me begin by offering a more complete presentation of 
20. !d. 
21. !d. at 272. 
22. I have explained briefly why consent is of central importance to contract in 
Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 CoLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986)[hereinafter 
Barnett, Consent Theory], and at greater length in Barnett, supra note 2; see also Randy E. 
Barnett, Contract Scholarship and the Reemergence of Legal Philosophy, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1223 
(1984); Randy E. Barnett, The Internal and External Analysis of Concepts, 11 CARDOZO L. 
REv. 525 (1990); Randy E. Barnett, Conflicting Visions: A Critique of Ian Macneil's Relational 
Theory of Contract, 78 VA. L. REv. 1175 (1992); Randy E. Barnett & Mary E. Becker, 
Be;·ond Reliance: Promissory Estoppel, Contract Fonnalities, and Misrepresentations, 15 HoFSTRA 
L. REv. 443 (1987). A condensed and revised account of this approach appears in 
Randy E. Barnett, Rights and Remedies in a Consent Theory of Contract in LIABILITY AND 
RESPONSIBILITY: EssAYS IN LAw AND MoRALS 135 (R.G. Frey & Christopher Morris eds., 
1991). 
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the "consent to jurisdiction" argument that Coleman summa-
rizes. In making a legally enforceable agreement, parties con-
sent to more than the explicit terms in their agreement. To 
enter the realm of contract, and leave the realm of mere prom-
ise, the parties must signal or communicate their intention to 
be legally bound. This "manifested intention to be legally 
bound" is what I call "consent."23 By manifesting such an in-
tention, parties consent to the jurisdiction of some (monopoly 
or competitive) adjudicative and enforcement mechanism. 
Their consent forms the basis for an adjudicator's authority to 
render a binding judgment in a pure contracts case. Without 
this added implication, a consent to be legally bound means no 
more than any other commitment or promise.24 
Thus, consent to be legally bound must entail both parties 
accepting one of two propositions: 
(a) When a dispute arises that is not covered by an explicit 
term of the contract, whatever court has jurisdiction to re-
solve the dispute loses its jurisdiction and any loss that may 
have resulted from the transaction remains where it hap-
pened to fall; or 
(b) When a dispute arises that is not covered by an explicit 
term of the contract, whatever court has jurisdiction to re-
solve the dispute retains its jurisdiction and may allocate the 
loss according to some set of principles. 
While each of these propositions is logically consistent with a 
manifested intention to be legally bound, when parties are si-
lent on this issue, the actual meaning of their expression of as-
sent must be determined conventionally. Because the concept 
of consent is a communicative one, we must always seek the 
most plausible interpretation of the conduct of the parties 
within the relevant community of discourse.25 
If the second of these propositions more accurately ex-
23. I leave to one side the important issue of how manifested consent is related to 
subjective assent. As I explain elsewhere, a manifested consent can be "real" even when 
unaccompanied by subjective assent because communicated consent is the concept of 
consent that is at the root of contract theory. Admittedly, however, one reason for the 
centrality of communicated consent is its close empirical correspondence with subjec-
tive assent. See generally Barnett, supra note 2, at 898-902. 
24. While adequate for present purposes, this statement of the principle is incom-
plete. Prima fade contractual obligation arises when a person "voluntarily performs acts 
that convey[] her intention to create a legally enforceable obligation by transferring 
alienable rights." Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 22, at 300. This refined version of 
the principle is needed to handle problems that are beyond the scope of this article. 
25. See Barnett, supra note 2, at 855-59. 
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presses the actual intentions of most contracting parties when 
they consent to be legally bound, then there is an implicit con-
sent to resolve disputes not governed by explicit contract terms 
according to promulgated background rules and procedures. 
Thus, courts enforce background rules with actual, not hypo-
thetical, consensual authorization. This is not to claim, how-
ever, that courts are always free to enforce any background rule 
whatsoever when parties consent to be legally bound. The next 
question is to determine the content of the background rules 
whose enforcement can be justified as consensual. 
When the cost of learning the content of and contracting 
around contract law is sufficiently low, by remaining silent on a 
particular matter, parties can be said to have consented to any 
promulgated default rule. 26 That is, silence under these cir-
cumstances manifests a consent to the enforcement of those 
rules that one could have changed by one's express agreement 
but did not. When, however, these conditions do not obtain, it 
is no longer safe to conclude that silence means consent to 
whatever background rules may happen to exist. 
In the absence of these circumstances, if the enforcement of 
particular default rules is to be justified as consensual, these 
default rules should be chosen (a) to reflect the probable tacit 
understandings of the parties, and (b) to reduce the likelihood 
of subjective disagreements arising between the parties. 27 
These functions are best performed by default rules that reflect 
the common sense expectations in the community of discourse 
to which the parties belong.28 I call these "conventionalist" de-
fault rules. In attempting to determine the content of conven-
tionalist default rules, a possible relationship between actual 
consent and the hypothetical rational bargain emerges. 
Although this relationship is, as Coleman suggests, "epistemic, 
not analytic, " 29 the epistemic connection is different from what 
he describes. 
How do we determine the content of the parties' tacit under-
standings given that it is generally difficult either to discern 
them directly or to determine the expectations that prevail in 
the relevant community of discourse? A rational bargaining 
26. See id. at 864-67. 
27. See id. at 874-97. 
28. See id. 
29. CoLEMAN, supra note 1, at 273. 
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model-if it can deliver what Coleman promises30-could pro-
vide a good method for legal theorists to determine what most 
parties' consent to jurisdiction means when their express 
agreement is silent. If most parties tacitly expect that "fair" 
default provisions will be supplied when gaps in their explicit 
consent are revealed, rational bargaining theory may help de-
termine what terms most parties deem to be fair. A court may 
presume that the particular parties before it implicitly con-
sented ex ante to the imposition of terms that would be in their 
rational self-interest. In this manner, rational bargaining theory 
may be able to capture the "common sense" meaning of the 
parties' silence. 
Of course, a presumption that any given pair of parties 
would consider the "common sense" rules that result from a 
rational bargaining analysis to be a fair way of resolving their 
dispute could be factually mistaken in a particular case. None-
theless, we may still be warranted in adopting a presumption in 
favor of the rational default term if so doing will reduce the 
incidence and severity of erroneous enforcement. In this way, 
hypothetical consent may be seen as evidence of actual consent 
on issues about which the parties are silent, and the rational 
bargain may be viewed as evidence of hypothetical consent. Or, 
perhaps more accurately, in the absence of empirical evidence of 
what actual parties in the relevant community of discourse 
mean when they consent in a particular situation, we may safely 
presume that they intended the default rule suggested by a ra-
tional bargaining analysis. 
In sum, given a practical assessment that most contracting 
parties are rationally self-interested actors, we may adopt the 
rational bargain as the presumptive meaning of consent. Thus, 
a legal system would be morally justified in enforcing rational 
background terms, unless it believes that the normal assump-
tion of rationality did not hold. According to this account, the 
rational bargaining model, although potentially useful, is 
merely an interpretive "half-way house" between an actual 
manifestation of consent and empirical evidence of what most 
persons actually mean by such manifestations. 
This is not to deprecate the practical value of the rational 
30. I assume throughout this analysis that rational bargaining theory can actually 
determine the content of a person's rational choice. If this assumption proves inaccu-
rate, then a rational bargaining model cannot perform the role I identify (or any other). 
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bargaining model to a legal system or to legal theorists. Despite 
decades of cries for more empirical research into contracting 
practice, such research is still rare. Moreover, as I discuss be-
low, monopolistic legal regimes thwart the epistemic function 
of a free market in legal jurisdictions, necessitating some effec-
tive substitute for discovering the actual intentions of most par-
ties. Therefore, if consent is to be given a meaning that 
corresponds to the actual meaning in the relevant community, 
some more abstract method of approximating this meaning 
without costly empirical research or market information would 
be invaluable. 
We now may tum to Coleman's charge that because "[t]he 
default rules of any jurisdiction are generally a nonnegotiable 
part of [the parties'] bargain,"31 the consent to jurisdiction ap-
proach is inapplicable in the absence of a competitive market in 
jurisdictions. Without free choice among jurisdictions and 
among packages of default rules that each jurisdiction pro-
vides, is not Coleman correct that we must still rely on hypo-
thetical rather dian actual consent in our choice of default 
rules? Coleman argues that if "the claim is that a default rule is 
justified to the extent that it would be freely chosen in a competi-
tive market for authoritative jurisdiction, then the defense of 
[a] default rule itself relies upon arguments from hypothetical, 
not explicit consent. "32 
While this argument has some merit, it does not support any 
conclusions about a fundamental or necessary relationship be-
tween hypothetical and actual consent. Instead, it suggests only 
that we must rely on hypothetical consent where consumer 
choice is restricted. 33 Here, as elsewhere, the market is a 
unique source of otherwise unobtainable information. 34 Ra-
tional bargaining theory may attempt to "mimic the market," 
but even the best rational bargaining theorists will sometimes 
err in interpreting the meaning of the parties' consent to be 
legally bound. So long as consumers of legal systems are de-
nied free choice among legal jurisdictions, we are deprived of 
31. CoLEMAN, supra note I, at 275. 
32. /d. at 276. 
33. See Randy E. Barnett, Pursuing justice in a Free Society: Part Two-Crime Prevmtion 
and the Legal Order, 5 CRIM. jusT. ETHICS 30 (Winter/Spring I 986) (describing how a 
more competitive legal order could function). A recent and more elaborate treatment 
of this thesis can be found in BRUCE L. BENSON, THE ENTERPRISE OF LAW (1990). 
34. See Barnett, supra note 2, at 902-05. 
No.3] Contract and Consent 793 
market information with which to correct the errors produced 
by rational choice or any other form of abstract theory. 
Consider liquidated damages clauses, which reveal con-
tracting parties' actual preference regarding the measure of re-
covery for breach of contract. When such provisions are known 
to be readily enforceable, parties who remain silent are pre-
sumably satisfied with the prevailing default rule, which meas-
ures damages by the expectancy interest. When courts refuse 
to enforce such provisions, however, we may be correct that by 
remaining silent most parties have implicitly chosen the expec-
. tancy measure of damages, but we are denied access to a pool 
of explicit choices to help confirm our interpretive hypothesis. 
In sum, the circumstantial evidence of consent by silence to the 
expectancy measure is greatly weakened. The parties' silence 
may have resulted not from consent but instead from the futil-
ity of negotiating an express clause that is unlikely to be en-
forced. Thus, to the extent that freedom of contract in any 
phase of contracting is absent, 35 the silence of the parties on 
any given issue is rendered considerably more ambiguous than 
necessary. 
Still, where parties are protected from having contracts im-
posed upon them in the absence of their manifested intention 
to be legally bound, this consent can be viewed as a meaningful 
act. Under these conditions, if a rational bargaining approach is 
feasible, the default rules it recommends may well correspond 
to the actual meaning of such consent for most parties. In this 
way, while the nonexistence of a free market in legal jurisdic-
tions deprives us of an extremely important source of knowl-
edge about the meaning of a choice to be legally bound, it does 
not completely undermine our ability to discern the meaning of 
consent. 
A consent theory, then, offers the following epistemic con-
nection between consent and rational bargaining theory: 
When parties manifest their consent to be legally bound, courts 
often need to interpret the meaning of their silence with re-
spect to "gaps" in their manifested assent. In such circum-
stances, silence is most likely to mean what the majority of 
similarly situated persons thinks it means. Since most people 
35. Even a consent theory of contract would limit freedom of contract in some ways, 
as, for example, with consent to transfer inalienable rights. See Randy E. Barnett, Con-
tract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, 4 Soc. PHIL. & PoL'Y 179 (1986). 
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are rational, silence most likely means what a rational person 
would think it means. Rational bargaining theory promises 
legal theorists seeking to determine the meaning of silence a 
substitute for the empirical information provided either by so-
cial scientific research or by the market. 
Thus, while rational bargaining theory may prove to be a 
highly useful interpretive device in an informationally imper-
fect world, it has justificatory value only within a regime of ac-
tual consent. Absent a manifested intention to be legally 
bound, interpreters using a rational bargaining approach sim-
ply have nothing to interpret. 36 
II. THE DUIY TO DISCLOSE AND THE LIBERAL 
CoNCEPTION oF FRAuD 
A. Coleman :r Analysis of the Duty to Disclose 
Coleman's underestimation of the informational function of 
contractual consent is also evident in his discussion of Laidlaw 
v. Organ. 37 Laidlaw involved a tobacco purchase contract made 
during the War of 1812. At the time the contract was executed, 
the buyer had advance information that the treaty ending the 
war had been signed, promising an end to the naval blockade 
of New Orleans that had been suppressing the price of tobacco. 
When asked by the seller if he knew anything that might affect 
the price of tobacco, however, the buyer failed to disclose this 
information. The legal issue was whether the seller could avoid 
the contract because of this failure to disclose. Chief Justice 
John Marshall, speaking for the Supreme Court, endorsed a de-
fault rule of nondisclosure: 
The question in this case is, whether the intelligence of ex-
trinsic circumstances which might influence the price of the 
commodity, and which was exclusively within the knowledge 
of the vendee, ought to have been communicated by him to 
the vendor? The court is of the opinion that he was not 
bound to communicate it.38 
Anthony Kronman has defended this rule by focusing atten-
tion on the incentives it provides for the deliberate production 
36. See Barnett, supra note 2, at 859-73 (discussing the role of consent in justifying 
contractual enforcement of default rules). 
37. Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817). 
38. /d. at 195 (quoted in CoLEMAN, supra note I, at 249). 
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of valuable information.39 Consequently, Kronman believes 
that information that is casually obtained should have to be dis-
closed. In contrast, Coleman rejects the distinction between 
deliberately and casually obtained information and instead 
stresses that whether information is productive depends upon 
whether it is predominantly "technological" in nature or 
whether it is predominantly "redistributive."40 
For Coleman, the crucial question is whether the value of the 
information at issue "derives from technology, gains from allo-
cating information more efficiently," or from "distribution, 
wealth transfers that follow from price changes."41 He main-
tains that 
all information has a technological as well as a redistributive 
dimension. In many cases, investment in information will be 
socially efficient because the technological gains will out-
weigh the costs of investment. However, in some cases, the 
technological effects will be less significant than the redis-
tributive ones. In these cases, private investment can exceed 
social retum.42 
Applying this distinction, Coleman concludes that imposing a 
duty to disclose is not always nonproductive or inefficient. 
The efficiency of a property right in information depends 
upon whether the technological or the distributive dimen-
sions of the information dominate. If the information is 
largely distributive in its impact, a property right in informa-
tion may well be inefficient. So we should be reluctant to ac-
cept the conclusion that the best argument for a property 
right in information as such is that it encourages efficient in-
vestment in gathering information.43 
Both Kronman's efficiency analysis, which distinguishes be-
tween casually and deliberately discovered information, and 
Coleman's efficiency analysis, which distinguishes between the 
technological and redistributive effects of information, miss the 
most important issue raised by mandating a duty to disclose 
such "extrinsic" information. 
39. See Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Infonnation, and the Law of Contracts, 
11 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (1978). 
40. Coleman takes this distinction from jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of 
bifonnation and the Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AM. EcoN. REv. 651 (1977). 
41. CoLEMAN, supra note 1, at 250. 
42. /d. at 251. 
43. /d. at 254. 
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B. The Paradox of a Right of Nondisclosure 
[Vol. 15 
Once again the issue involves the meaning of silence. To fail 
to disclose some fact is to remain silent about it. Those who 
favor a duty to disclose contend that sometimes such silence 
can constitute a fraudulent misrepresentation. This implication 
of silence is graphically highlighted in the Laidlaw case by the 
buyer's silence in the face of the seller's direct question con-
cerning whether the buyer had any information that would af-
fect the price of tobacco. The buyer's silence conveyed a false 
representation that the buyer ·had no such information. Was 
this intentional misrepresentation fraudulent? I say no. 
All speculative resource trading involves betting on price 
changes. Such speculation is impossible unless a legal system 
adheres to the liberal conception of freedom of contract. The 
liberal principle of freedom from contract requires that each 
party obtain the other's consent before a transaction may re-
ceive legal protection; the liberal principle of freedom to con-
tract protects the enforceability of the parties' manifestation of 
consent from interference by others or from a change of mind 
by one of the parties that is not consented to by the other.44 
Enforcing a right to speculate on changes in resource prices 
while permitting parties to withhold information concerning 
the potential demand or supply of the traded resource provides 
substantial social benefits that extend well beyond the parties 
to a particular transaction.45 True, as Kronman has stressed, a 
right of nondisclosure creates incentives to generate useful in-
formation deliberately, but that is only one of its advantages. 
Both Kronman and Coleman overlook the incentive that this 
right creates to disseminate certain vital information, whether it 
is acquired casually or deliberately. 
At first glance, a rule permitting those in possession of infor-
mation relevant to demand for particular scarce resources-or 
44. For an extended account of the crucial social functions performed by these two 
aspects of contractual freedom, see Barnett, supra note 2, at 829-59; see also Randy E. 
Barnett, The Function of Several Property and Freedom of Contract, 9 Soc. PHIL. & PoL'Y 62 
(1992). 
45. The analysis presented here does not apply to speculation on pure lotteries or 
other "nonproductive" games of chance. The case for a right to engage in such specu-
lation or gambling is quite different than that which can be made for a right to make 
speculative resource transfers. I have offered this type of analysis of the right to con-
sume intoxicating substances in Randy E. Barnett, Curing the Drug Law Addiction: The 
Harmful Side-Effects of Legal Prohibition, in DEALING Wrm DRUGS 73 (Ronald Hamowy ed., 
1987). 
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what Marshall called "intelligence of extrinsic circumstances 
which might influence the price of the commodity"46-to with-
hold it from their trading partners seems inimical to the dis-
semination of such information. Closer analysis, however, 
reveals that a nondisclosure rule does indeed promote that 
end. To put the matter paradoxically, permitting persons to 
conceal certain types of information best promotes the dissemi-
nation of that information. 
The resolution of the paradox lies in the fact that, their ver-
bal silence notwithstanding, the actions of persons in possession 
of Marshall's extrinsic intelligence disseminate more informa-
tion than mere words ever could. Both consenting to trade and 
withholding one's consent importantly affect the market price 
of a resource.47 The movement of resource prices that such de-
cisions cause in the aggregate conveys invaluable and otherwise 
unobtainable48 knowledge. Resource prices produced both by 
those who trade and those who decline to trade represent a 
summation of innumerable amounts of radically-dispersed in-
formation concerning the competing alternative uses of scarce 
resources and the relative subjective desirability of these uses. 
Therefore, a person in possession of "windfall" information 
concerning a particular scarce resource still contributes impor-
tantly to the welfare of others by causing the price of that re-
source to move in an information-revealing direction, whether 
the direction is up, down, or unchanged. The price-effect of the 
decision to trade or refrain from trading results notwithstand-
ing that the trader may neither have produced the information 
nor intentionally disclosed it. I do not claim that this informa-
tional process is perfect, but only that it is both vital and 
irreplaceable. 
Imposing a duty to disclose on those in possession of infor-
mation concerning a future change in market demand for a re-
source eliminates the possibility of profiting from the 
information, and thereby greatly reduces any incentive for po-
46. Laidlaw, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) at 195. 
47. Many, including economists, often seem to forget that the prevailing market 
price reflects the price at which the marginal seller is willing to transact with the _margi-
nal buyer. The market price of, for example, a house is as influenced by the decisions 
of all homeowners who prefer to hold on to their property rather than accept the pre-
vailing market price as it is influenced by those at the margin who consent to such 
transfers. 
48. See Barnett, supra note 2, at 831-35 (discussing the limited accessibility of per-
sonal and local knowledge). 
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tential traders to engage in information-revealing transactions. 
Consequently, a legal duty to disclose extrinsic intelligence to 
the other party would greatly reduce disclosures of this infor-
mation to the society at large. Moreover, such a disclosure rule 
would cause countless persons to be misled. By eliminating the 
incentive to trade on information, enforcing a duty to disclose 
would induce persons in possession of extrinsic intelligence in-
advertently to convey to the market by their silence the inaccu-
rate impression that future demand will be lower or higher 
than they know it to be. 
What makes Laidlaw v. Organ a "hard case" worthy of includ-
ing in casebooks is the fact that the extrinsic information in 
question would have reached the market (and society at large) 
within hours no matter what the buyer did, thus obscuring the 
pervasive informational benefits of a general nondisclosure 
rule. In this regard, Laidlaw resembles the proverbial bar exam 
question that asks whether it is murder to shoot and kill a man 
who is falling from the top of Sears Tower as he passes the 50th 
floor. After all, you are supposed to think, he was just seconds 
away from death anyway. But the desired answer is that every 
murder involves cutting short the life of someone who is going 
to die anyway-in principle, the amount of time that the mur-
der takes from the victim is immaterial. So too, the principle of 
Laidlaw is that persons have a right to profit by trading on se-
cret information that one day may reach the market by other 
means. 
Of course, if every murder cut only seconds from a person's 
life, the doctrine of murder would probably be much different 
than it is. Similarly, if all information bearing on the supply or 
demand for resources would inevitably reach everyone within 
hours even if persons in possession of new information with-
held it, the social function performed by a right to withhold 
such information from one's trading partner would be greatly 
diminished. Indeed, the need for speculative commodity and 
other exchanges would also be diminished. Any such scenario 
is, however, pernicious fantasy. 
What holds true for Kronman's distinction between deliber-
ately and casually acquired information applies with equal force 
for Coleman's application of Hirshleifer's distinction between 
the distributional and technological effects of information. Like 
Kronman, Coleman misses the fact that virtually all information 
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concerning existing relative scarcity is hidden and only a re-
gime of private property and freedom of contract is capable of 
producing the price signals and movements that aggregate and 
disseminate this information to society at large. To my mind, 
the social function performed by private actors participating in 
commodities markets using undisclosed information is crucial 
whether or not the information also has a technological or a 
redistributive effect. 
C. Squaring Nondisclosure with the Prohibition Against Fraud 
None of the foregoing analysis directly addresses the issue of 
whether the failure to disclose extrinsic information is fraudu-
lent. Mter all, a free market presupposes the illegality of both 
forcibly and fraudulently induced rights transfers. I conclude 
that although the buyer's silence in Laidlaw v. Organ was cer-
tainly intentionally misleading, it was not fraudulent. The root 
of the problem stems not from the misleading nature of the 
buyer Organ's answer but from the unfairness of the seller 
Laidlaw's question. When viewed in the proper context, 
Laidlaw's question can be seen to be inappropriate and, there-
fore, he is simply not entitled to a truthful answer. 
To understand why, suppose that before each exchange 
every commodities trader asked every other trader whether she 
was in possession of any information that would affect the fu-
ture demand for or supply of the commodity in question. An 
entitlement to a truthful answer to such a question-that is, a 
duty to disclose-would virtually eliminate the institution 
within which both buyer and seller are operating. Therefore, in 
this bargaining context, such questions should not be asked 
and, if asked, need not be answered truthfully. Silence, how-
ever misleading, is the appropriate response.49 
This insight highlights a more general and widely neglected 
feature of legal theory that I call the "nonpervasiveness princi-
ple." Defenses to consensual obligation must describe excep-
tional circumstances that undermine the normal significance of 
consent.50 Any purported defense that would potentially apply 
to every transaction cannot be legitimate, so long as consent is 
deemed to justify contractual obligation. 
49. An affirmative misrepresentation not offered in response to such an inquiry 
would be quite another matter, however. 
50. See Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 22, at 318-19. 
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This nonpervasiveness principle is not limited to contract de-
fenses. It applies as well to every defense that purports to rebut 
any form of prima facie legal obligation however grounded. No 
legal defense that would work potentially in every case can be 
permitted because, no matter how plausible such a purported 
defense may appear, to allow it would be to undermine the 
prima facie legal obligation it opposes. If the legal obligation at 
issue is morally justified, no legal defense can be accepted 
which entirely eliminates its operation.51 
Suppose in Laidlaw that instead of asking indirectly about the 
blockade, the seller asked the following: "Would you be pre-
pared to pay more for the tobacco than you are offering?" 
Suppose further that the buyer lied and said, "No, this is my 
top offer," when in fact he would be willing to double his offer. 
Is this lie a fraud on the seller? According to the nonpervasive-
ness principle the answer must be no, because to hold other-
wise would undermine virtually every such transaction. As I 
discussed in the context of situations where persons conceal 
the fact that they are acting as the agent of an "undisclosed" 
principal: 
In reality, every seller who agrees to a price necessarily as-
sumes the risk that the buyer might have been willing and 
able to pay more, just as every buyer assumes the risk that a 
seller would have been willing or able to accept less. Because 
such ignorance, whether conscious or not, is pervasive, it 
cannot undermine the normal significance of consent. 52 • 
To be fraudulent, then, a misstatement of fact must concern 
some "intrinsic" (to borrow Justice Marshall's terminology) 
characteristic of the resource itself as opposed to some knowl-
edge relevant only to the "extrinsic" demand for the resource 
in question. For example, it would be fraud to stand mute in 
the face of a buyer's statement that "I assume that these eggs 
are Grade A" when the seller knows them to be of an inferior 
grade. It would not be fraudulent for the buyer to conceal her 
knowledge of an important new study pronouncing eggs to be 
far more healthful than previously thought. Although both 
51. This principle can also be reversed: When a legal defense that invariably under· 
mines a given legal obligation is found to be morally justified, then that legal obligation 
is illegitimate. 
52. Randy E. Barnett, Squaring Undisclosed Agency With Contract Theory, 75 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1969, 1991 (1988). 
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facts could, if disclosed, potentially affect the price of the eggs, 
only the first involves the description of the eggs themselves. 
The nonpervasiveness principle accounts for Justice Mar-
shall's distinction between intelligence of extrinsic and intrinsic 
circumstances. Still, a complete understanding of the rationale 
for this distinction requires that we consider the different func-
tions performed by the prohibitions of duress and fraud. 
D. The Functional Difference Between Duress and Fraud 
A fundamental tenet of the liberal conception of justice is 
that resources rightfully belonging to another may not be taken 
without the manifested consent of the rights-holder. This tenet 
bars the use or threat of force to obtain such consent; thus, a 
contract signed or "consented to" under duress is void. In ad-
dition to this prohibition of force to obtain consent, liberalism 
has always barred persons from obtaining consent by means of 
fraud. Although the equating of force with fraud is both long-
asserted and well-accepted by liberals, its theoretical basis re-
mains obscure. This is because these two doctrines perform 
distinct functions. 
Force is prohibited as a means of obtaining consent in im-
portant part because its use would legitimate transfers of re-
sources that do not reflect the knowledge of the rights-holder 
regarding the potential uses and value of the resource in ques-
tion. Permitting forcible transfers disrupts the complex, but vi-
tal, mechanism of information dispersal that only consensual 
transfers can make possible. The prohibition on the use of 
force reflects an effort to handle what I call the "first-order 
problem of knowledge," which consists of permitting persons 
and associations to act on the basis of their diverse local and 
personal knowledge while taking into account the knowledge of 
others about which they are pervasively ignorant.53 
The function of the prohibition against fraud is related, but 
nonetheless different. This prohibition reflects an effort to han-
dle a problem of interpersonal communication. Unlike the case 
of force or duress, a manifestation of consent that is fraudu-
lently induced does reflect the knowledge of the person con-
senting, but the resources actually received by the defrauded 
53. The analysis presented in this paragraph is merely a summary of that presented 
in Barnett, supra note 2, and in Barnett, supra note 44. 
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transferee do not conform to the description communicated by 
the transferor.54 Due to the transferor's failure to deliver re-
sources conforming to the rights he communicated and con-
veyed by his manifestation of consent, a legal remedy is needed 
to close the unjust gap that has arisen between the distribution 
of resources and the distribution of rights. 
In sum, when a seller uses duress to obtain the buyer's mani-
festation of consent, the transfer may not reflect the buyer's 
knowledge; with fraud, the buyer's manifestation of consent 
does reflect her knowledge but the resulting distribution of re-
sources does not reflect the consent that was communicated. 
This type of gap arises when there is a discrepancy between the 
description of a resource's "intrinsic" qualities and the re-
sources actually delivered. No such discrepancy occurs when 
intelligence concerning extrinsic circumstances affecting the 
supply of or demand for the resource is concealed. 
Does this analysis of fraud, which accounts for the prohibi-
tion on transfers of rights induced by knowingly communicat-
ing false information, extend to the failure to convey true 
information that, if known, would influence the decision of the 
other party to consent to a transfer? The foregoing analysis 
suggests that a duty to disclose should exist when the failure to 
disclose creates a disparity between the rights transferred and 
the resources received. This may occur, for instance, when (a) 
an item, as it appears, would normally have certain intrinsic 
characteristics, (h) a reasonable inspection will not reveal the 
absence of these characteristics, (c) the seller knows that these 
characteristics are absent, and (d) the seller has reason to know 
that knowledge of this fact is "material," that is, it would likely 
influence the manifestation of assent by the buyer. An example 
of this is a product with a latent defect. When these circum-
stances obtain, the resources conveyed to the buyer do not 
conform to the substance of the rights conveyed by the seller. 
On the other hand, a duty to disclose is not warranted by this 
analysis of fraud when the seller remains silent about a fact that 
does not concern the substance of the rights being transferred. 
In such a case, the seller does not deliver resources that fail to 
54. For example, a defrauded buyer may know that she values the use of the re· 
sources she is obtaining from the seller more than those she is transferring to the 
seller, but the resources she actually receives do not conform to the description that 
was communicated to her by the deceiving party. 
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conform to the rights that were represented as being trans-
ferred. For example (to vary the facts of Laidlaw v. Organ), sup-
pose a seller sells grain at a price that has been greatly 
increased due to the shortages caused by a war. Although the 
seller fails to communicate his knowledge that the war has 
ended and consequently that prices are about to fall, he com-
mits no fraud provided that he delivers grain of a quality and 
quantity conforming to the rights that were communicated and 
transferred. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this article, I have applied my recently-expanded account 
of a consent theory of contract to Jules Coleman's analyses of 
contractual default rules and the duty of contracting parties to 
disclose information to each other. First, I showed how, when 
determining conventionalist default rules that reflect the com-
mon-sense meaning prevailing in a particular community of 
discourse, a rational bargaining approach may usefully supple-
ment or substitute for the information provided by market 
choices or empirical research. At least in contract theory, how-
ever, a rational bargaining model has justificatory value, not as 
an alternative to consent, but within an overall consensual 
framework. 
Second, I explained how both Anthony Kronman's distinc-
tion between deliberately and casually obtained information, 
and Coleman's distinction between the technological and redis-
tributive effects of information miss the more fundamental in-
formational function of a right of nondisclosure. I showed that 
the refusal of one contracting party to disclose information to 
the other, even when asked, is not fraudulent when the infor-
mation relates only to the supply or demand for the resources 
that are the subject of the contract. My account involved both 
the "nonpervasiveness principle" that applies to any defense to 
prima facie legal obligation and an analysis of the distinct social 
functions performed by the prohibitions on force and fraud. 
Significantly, the analysis of both the role of hypothetical 
consent and the legitimacy of a duty to disclose turned on the 
informational functions that contractual consent uniquely 
performs. 
